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R E S E A R C H E S S A Y
A N G I E N G Ọ C T R Ầ N A N D V I C K I C R I N I S
Migrant Labor and State Power:
Vietnamese Workers in Malaysia and Vietnam
The demands by global labor markets for foreign migrant workers to dothe jobs unwanted by local citizens play an important role in transna-
tional labor migration. The Vietnamese state has responded to these global
labor demands by sending workers to fill jobs overseas in order to address the
unemployment and poverty issues at home.With an estimated .–.million
Vietnamese citizens entering the labor market each year, the Vietnamese
state has policies to promote global labor migration through  as a
poverty-reduction strategy.
As of , the state has signed intergovernmental agreements to send
more than , contract-based migrants to work in over sixty countries
and territories in East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and
the former Eastern Bloc countries. In particular, demands for domestic and
factory workers attracted about two hundred thousand Vietnamese migrants
to East Asia and forty thousand (for construction and service jobs) to the
Middle East and North Africa. Between  and , the top five labor
markets for Vietnamese migrants included Taiwan (, workers),
Malaysia (,), South Korea (,), Japan (,), and Africa and
the Middle East (,). The  top five global labor markets for
Vietnam show increasing flows of workers to theMiddle East and to high- and
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middle-income states in Asia: Taiwan (, workers), Japan (,), Korea
(,), Saudi Arabia (,), and Malaysia (,).
International organizations such as the International Labor Organization
(ILO) and the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Triangle project—partially
funded by the Australian government—have been providing technical assis-
tance and facilitating the monitoring of Vietnam’s global labor migration
process. Since , international NGOs and trade union bodies have man-
aged to bring international focus to the exploitation of migrant workers,
including Vietnamese workers in Malaysia. International activists have
pointed to Malaysia’s poor human rights record in the lead-up to the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement with the United States and out-
lined the exorbitant recruitment costs, human trafficking, modern-day
enslavement, detention, injury, and even death of thousands of poor migrant
workers.
There have been a few studies of Vietnamese migrant workers in
developed countries based on fieldwork interviews conducted primarily
in northern Vietnam. Hong-Zen Wang and Danièle Bélanger delve into
the complexities of international labor export and import through field-
work conducted in Taiwan and northern Vietnam from  to .
They demonstrate that transnational recruitment intermediaries along
with migration and work policies of Vietnam and Taiwan dictate the
migration process and lead to a vicious cycle of debt-bondage of Viet-
namese migrant workers. Another study shows that host countries such
as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are desirable because they offer higher
wages, but poor workers cannot always meet the requirements of educa-
tion, skills, and pre-departure training costs (language and legal instruc-
tions) needed to migrate to these countries. Lan Anh Hoàng and Brenda
S. A. Yeoh’s study of Vietnamese female migrant workers in Taiwan finds
interesting contradictions between stereotypes of Vietnamese women’s
sexuality and actual sexual practices in real-life contexts, thus making
a significant contribution to scholarship on migration and sexuality. In
another article, Lan Anh Hoàng and Yeoh provide a critical study on
remittances and the significance of debts incurred when financing trans-
national labor migration and how these debts affect migrant workers and
their families.
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The Malaysian labor market is attractive to low-income Vietnamese
migrants due to the lower requirements. A large number of labor migration
studies on Malaysia focuses on domestic workers and highlights the lack of
protection against exploitation that foreign domestic workers receive in
Malaysia. Christine Chin’s work highlights the ways developmental states
encouraged Indonesian and Filipino domestic workers to work in Malaysian
homes so Malaysian women could enter and remain in the workforce.
Juanita Elias looks at the rights of foreign domestic workers and how the
Indonesian government placed an embargo on Indonesian domestic work-
ers going to Malaysia. Killias examines what it means to be an Indonesian
worker in Malaysia and the “illegal” migrants’ resistance against coercion
and exploitation in Malaysia. Other studies focus on foreign workers
(including Indonesians, Bangladeshis, Vietnamese, Nepalese, and Cham
Muslims from Vietnam) in factories and the lack of enforcement of gov-
ernment levies, minimum wages and procedures in managing migrant
workers beyond recruitment, as well as the migrants' agency. Most of the
literature has focused on Indonesian and Bangladeshi migrant workers
because they were the first to come to Malaysia to work in the agricultural
and construction sectors and the textile industry. They were thought to be
more suited to working amidst a predominantly Malay population, since
they shared the same religion with Malays. However, Indonesians proved to
be problematic, demanding higher wages and better conditions, causing
a few riots in the process. Bangladeshi workers were exploited by corrupt
middlemen; these recruitment agents continued to bring in workers during
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and left large numbers stranded at the
Malaysian airport. Therefore, the Malaysian government decided to diver-
sify its intake of migrant workers and recruit other ethnicities such as
Vietnamese and Nepalese. After the GFC, the Malaysian government did
not allow Bangladeshi workers to come to Malaysia for six years and
increased the numbers of Vietnamese and Nepalese workers. These workers
were assumed to be more suited to factory dicipline and less likely to cause
riots. Few studies focus on Vietnamese workers in Malaysia. Vicki Crinis
discusses how social relations of production were transformed through
neoliberal trade policies and transnational labour migration. Lê Thu Huong
focuses on the impacts of the recruitment process to Malaysia on migrant
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workers. Angie Ngọc Trần uncovers how Cham Muslims responded to the
Vietnamese labor export policy.
This article contributes to the transnational labor migration literature by
focusing on Vietnamese factory workers in Malaysia. By conducting multi-
sited interviews in Vietnam and Malaysia between  and , we sought
to understand how the transnational labor system works and how migrant
workers navigate this process.
We argue that the two emerging economies of Vietnam and Malaysia, as
part of a global neoliberal system, produce citizens and non-citizen subjects
who comply with labor export and foreign worker policies. Within this trans-
national governmentality, the two states manage labor migration to ensure
both government and individual accumulation so they can sustain their
policies. Vietnamese migrant workers in the Malaysian labor market nego-
tiate their roles throughout this process, and at times even benefit from it.
We find evidence that our interviewees want to accumulate capital in order
to “change their lives” [đổi đời]. Conscious of the exploitative working
conditions in the Malaysian labor market, workers engage in acts of resis-
tance against the different levels of power and discipline directed at them.
But workers are also aware of opportunities and prepare for subsequent
work in higher-paying countries such as Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, where
they can find more favorable conditions. Through multi-sited interviews in
Vietnam and Malaysia we document both open and covert resistance.
When in Malaysia, some migrants became undocumented and built reli-
gious support networks. Upon returning home, many dragged their feet to
pay back loans, while aspiring to work in Taiwan, Korea and Japan.
Regarding the organization of this article, first we develop an integrative
theoretical framework for examining migrant work and state power. Second,
we explain our transnational methodology, which includes interviews with
workers in both the sending and receiving countries. Finally, we analyze the
migrant workers’ agency while in Malaysia and upon their return to
Vietnam.
Theoretical Framework
Both Vietnamese migrant workers and the states that send and receive them
are tied to the neoliberal market system. In the s, free market
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fundamentalism restored the power of capitalism, which allowed for the
privatization of most welfare state structures and the decline of trade union-
ism in the West. This philosophy implied that “good” government could
not interfere with economic and financial mechanisms, and therefore little
was done by national governments to regulate the flow of globalization and
the inequality between rich and developing countries, which set the stage for
global labor migration.
As noted in the introduction, we recognize earlier literatures on the
exploitation of migrant workers and their resistance. None of those studies
used Foucault’s concepts, so we use a Foucauldian framework to explain
transnational state power and migrant workers’ negotiations. In particular,
we draw on the concepts of biopower, governmentality, and biopolitical
subject formation.
Foucault introduced the concepts of biopower and governmentality to
describe the ways in which governments manage populations and produce
citizens best suited to fulfill government policies. The function of biopower
is productive: “no longer to kill, but to invest (in) life through and
through”; modern state power is a series of productive rather than repres-
sive networks (as per Foucault’s micro-power theory). Modern state power
is dedicated to governing populations to ensure the right to life, health,
happiness, and growth. But through diverse disciplining techniques, state
administration and surveillance create the biopolitical subject, governable as
citizens. These subjects are mobilized by the state as resources, workers,
citizens, and family members to care for and to reproduce the next generation
of workers. In particular, state power includes disciplining institutions such as
schools, hospitals, and immigration and labor agencies that mold citizens. The
government also creates systems and technologies that teach subjects to con-
trol their behaviors.
Modern power is not only localized in the state but can also be reflected at
the everyday level; where there is power, there is resistance. The idea of
modern power helps us examine various forms of power and resistance used
by individuals and groups of migrant workers in Malaysia and, upon their
return, in Vietnam. While these acts of resistance do not overthrow the
system, they may bring about change. In the era of globalization, management
of biopower is also a matter of crossing borders to maximize profits. Nation-
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states attempt to regulate these border crossings, and workers attempt to
increase their earnings by crossing national borders to work in higher-
paying countries.
The Vietnamese and Malaysian states construct citizens and non-citizens
to promote transnational labor migration. In Vietnam, the government
wants its citizens educated and employed so they can earn money to support
themselves and their families. The state encourages citizens who are unable
to do so to seek overseas employment and save money to finance their future.
Female workers are considered to be the right kind of migrant worker for
Malaysia because they will work long hours to earn as muchmoney as possible
to send home to their families. According to the Malaysian government, the
suitable guest worker enhances the manufacturing sector in Malaysia by pro-
viding a disposable labor force. These workers cover their own travel and
recruitment costs, without any expense to the government or employers. They
are more desirable than native/citizen workers because they are willing to
work longer hours. They save employers the expense of paid benefits, and
can be easily dismissed in times of recession.
In the context of transnational migration, governments invest in techni-
ques of control such as coherent infrastructure and state agencies designed
to derive benefit from migrant workers. Robyn Magalit Rodriguez discusses
this concept in the case of the Philippines, a labor-sending country. She
argues that the Philippine state has invested in developing and maintaining
a labor export bureaucracy by establishing a global network of embassies and
consular offices that shape migration patterns of Filipinos, labor agencies,
and workers’ movements worldwide. As such, the state benefits from
migrant workers’ remittances, recruitment, and processing fees. In Viet-
nam, the state administrative powers that govern biopolitical subjects and
manage global migration include the state regulatory system (labor export
policies to promote global migration as an employment and poverty-
reduction strategy), the recruitment system (which is carried out by a com-
bination of private, state-owned, and privatized state companies) and the
state bureaucracies that control communication (the complex role of the
state media).
In addition, migrant workers themselves have interests that drive trans-
national labor migration. Clare O’Farrell states, “Foucault argues that the
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subject is an entity who is self-aware and capable of choosing how to act.”
We integrate the concept of workers’ agency into this integrative framework
to examine workers’ responses, remittances, and forms of resistance. This
concept can take various forms of structural and internal empowerment.
Nana Oishi’s research focuses on how low-capital female migrant workers in
manufacturing and domestic/service types of work have consciously
engaged in activities that reflect both forms of empowerment. Moreover,
Anju Mary Paul explains how workers aspire to climb a hierarchy of desti-
nation countries and to accumulate capital along the way. In this essay, we
show how migrant workers improve their capabilities by investing in them-
selves. Migrant workers who labor for manufacturing and construction
companies acquire new skills, languages, and self-confidence to invest in
their future. Broader worldviews create new aspirations and desires to go to
other countries for upward mobility.
In the neoliberal context, the remittance economy is essential due to the
widening of the income gap among countries in the region that participate
in the global labor market system. Remittances are important forms of
agency that have been studied by many scholars. Hai Anh La and Suiwah
Leung argue that remittances are motivated by two purposes: altruism
towards family members (with the largest shares sent to lower-income
groups as poverty alleviation) and “exchange motive” (remittances sent to
high-income households as an investment on behalf of the senders/migrant
workers). International remittances were being sent to . percent of rural
households and  percent of urban households by —the disparity is
due to households in the cities being more likely to have members migrating
to work overseas. Other scholars stress the importance of social meanings
of remittances. Md Mizanur Rahman and Lian Kwen Fee argue that remit-
tances are not a simple monetary transaction, but also a social transaction
with motivational aspects that are co-determined by the migrant workers
and their extended families. Yeoh et al., in their study of thirty Vietnamese
women who married Singaporean men through commercial matchmaking
agencies, argue that remittances can be considered as acts of recognition that
involve the performance and negotiation of their multiple roles (as wives,
mothers, daughters, or sisters) to maintain transnational (natal and marital)
family ties across distances. Scholars also argue that remittances can serve
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to reinforce status and networks in the migrant workers’ original
communities. Some agree that men and women negotiate remittances in
multiple ways.
Methodology
To emphasize the transnational dimension of this study, we conducted
multi-sited surveys with migrant workers in their home and host countries.
We identified our interviewees based on convenience sampling, which cre-
ated a snowball effect. We conducted the interviews off the factory floor to
ensure anonymity. The interviewed workers are identified in this article only
by pseudonyms.
Overall, our sample includes fifty informants—thirty-four workers and
sixteen government officials and expert informants—who were interviewed
between  and  by both authors (see Table  and Appendix I). With
the help of a state-owned recruitment company in Hồ Chí Minh City, Angie
Ngọc Trần began the multi-sited survey in  by interviewing fifteen
Vietnamese worker returnees then living in Hồ Chí Minh City to understand
their circumstances and to obtain information about their Vietnamese
friends who were still working in Malaysia. We feature four of the fifteen
interviewees in this study. These four interviewees worked in Malaysia with
thirty other Vietnamese workers on the same assembly line in a cookie
factory in Batu Pahat, a province in Malaysia. Then, based on the leads of
these returnees, we went to Batu Pahat to interview their friends. Addition-
ally, we went to Johor Bahru, an area with high concentrations of foreign
migrant workers, producing over forty percent of Malaysia’s textiles and
garments, furniture, foodstuffs and rubber gloves. We stood in front of the
shopping centers where workers shop on their days off and interviewed
several migrants, two of whom are featured in this study.
We conducted follow-up interviews through . In , Crinis
returned to Batu Pahat to organize a focus group interview with twelve
young male and female Vietnamese workers—all of whom were recruited
by government agencies—after church services in a hostel with translation
help from a Vietnamese female garment worker. With the support of a local
Christian-based NGO, Crinis also conducted interviews with five workers in
Penang, another location with a high concentration of Vietnamese migrant
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T A B L E 1 : Interviews with Workers in Vietnam and Malaysia
Pseudonyms/Hometown/
Recruitment Company
Work, Location
of the interviews
Interview
Year
Ms. Lan (Hải Dương) (VSC) (cookie factory, Batu Pahat) 2008
Ms. Hương (Hải Dương) (VSC) (cookie factory, Batu Pahat) 2008
Ms. Phương (HCMC) (SULECO) (cookie factory, HCMC) 2008, 2013
Ms. Mai (Cần Thơ) (SULECO) (cookie box label factory, Batu
Pahat)
2008
Ms. Minh (Cần Thơ) (Milaco) (garment factory, Batu Pahat) 2008
Ms. Chương (Thanh Hoá)
(Vilimex)
(garment factory, Johor Bahru) 2008
Ms. Nga (Thanh Hoá)
(LATUCO)
(restaurant worker, Batu Pahat) 2008
Ms. Nhàn (HCMC) (SULECO) (electrical parts, HCMC); wanted
to work for Clisal in Vietnam
2008
Ms. Xuân (HCMC) (SULECO) (making accessories for car seats,
HCMC)
2008
Ms. Trâm (Xuân’s sister) (received 700R/month from Xuân
to go to college on accounting,
HCMC)
2008, 2013
Mr. Đông (Hà Tĩnh)
(TRACONSIN Hà Nội
branch)
(plastic containers and bags
factory, Batu Pahat)
2008
Mr. Anh (Hà Tĩnh) (Công ty Việt
Hà)
(plastic sheets factory, Batu Pahat) 2008
Mr. Dương (Nghệ An)
(LATUCO)
(plastic/paper factory, Batu Pahat) 2008
Ms. Nguyệt (private agency) (apparel, Penang) 2010
Mr. San (private agency) (apparel, Penang) 2010
Ms. Phương (private agency) (apparel, Penang) 2010
Ms. Phạm (state agency) (apparel, Penang) 2010
Ms. Chi (state agency) (apparel, Penang) 2010
12 male and female Vietnamese
workers (state agencies)
Focus group interview in Batu
Pahat
2010
Mr. Nghĩa (An Giang) (private
agency)
Electronic factory in Malaysia 2013
Mr. Vũ (An Giang) (Sao Thái
Dương)
Wood furniture company in
Malaysia
2013
Ms. Hoa (An Giang) (Latuco) Electronic factory in Malaysia 2013
Ms. Huệ (An Giang) (Airseco) Machine parts factory in Malaysia 2013
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workers. Angie Ngọc Trần conducted some follow-up interviews with two
returnees in Hồ Chí Minh City in  and broadened the geographical
coverage by interviewing four returnees in An Giang province in the
Mekong Delta region.
To understand the function of the state in transnational migration sys-
tems, we include fifteen experts and special informants who played impor-
tant roles in both countries. Between  and , Angie Ngọc Trần
interviewed ten recruitment company directors, as well as officials from
labor unions and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MoLI-
SA) in Hồ Chí Minh City, Quảng Ngãi, Hà Nội, and An Giang. She also
interviewed state bank officials and journalists in An Giang and Hồ Chí
Minh City. Between  and , Crinis interviewed six employers, trade
unionists, social activists and religious organizations in Johor, Batu Pahat,
Negeri Sembilan, Malacca, Selangor, and Penang. Moreover, we comple-
mented our sample with secondary data, including government and union
reports, and newspaper articles from both countries that reveal the strengths
and weaknesses of labor export policies and worker protests.
Malaysian Governmentality and Institutions
The Malaysian government produces and manages non-citizens—foreign
workers such as Vietnamese migrants—best suited to fulfill their labor
demand, as reflected in their migrant worker policies. These temporary
foreign migrant workers toil in the jobs Malaysian workers no longer want.
The new global gender order means women in less-developed countries
perform the domestic and factory labor that allows Malaysian workers to
seek higher-skilled and higher-paying jobs. A managed migration pro-
gram requires workers to have a passport, work permit, and employer
contract for one to three years; pay levies; and to return home at the end
of the contract.
To visualize the transnational nature of this labor migration case, Figure 
portrays elements seen from Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s perspectives.
The government has been pressured by Malaysian employers to allow
migrant workers from poorer countries in the region to fill low-skilled
jobs in the manufacturing sector. This has run counter to the argument
raised by the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC) that the
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Malaysian government and employers should increase pay and enhance
skills for local Malaysians rather than hire more foreign workers. But since
manufacturing jobs were mostly in the export industry, manufacturers
wanted the government to keep the wages low to entice foreign inves-
tors. Unfortunately, as more and more unskilled transnational migrant
laborers filled these low-paying jobs, labor abuse became rampant in the
global commodity chains, especially in the less-transparent small and
medium enterprises.
The Malaysian government has allowed two recruitment systems to
manage foreign workers: ) the government’s one-stop recruitment center
and ) a system of privately owned outsourcing companies for employers
who require less than fifty workers. The outsourcing companies lack
accountability in fulfilling contracts and are reported to engage in corrupt
practices. The government’s one-stop recruitment center is better and
more reliable than the private outsourcing system, because when a worker
is employed via the government system, the factory employer listed on the
contract is responsible for the worker, allowing for compensation claims if
the worker is injured on the job. By contrast, the factory owner has no
responsibility to the worker if the worker is employed by a private out-
sourcing company.
The media in Malaysia reports some of the excesses of labor injustices,
but overall there is little criticism directed at employers and the Malaysian
government due to the Printing Presses and Publications Act of . Under
this legislation, the Home Affairs Minister is given “absolute discretion” in
the granting and revocation of printing and publication licenses, and can
also restrict or ban outright publications that are likely to endanger national
security interests or create social unrest. There is a substantial fine of
RM, and jail terms for those considered offenders by the Home Min-
istry. These penalties have discouraged the reporting of migrant worker
exploitation in mainstream newspapers. MTUC’s quarterly Labor Bulletin,
published online, reports abuses of migrant workers by employers and fre-
quently calls for the government to protect migrant workers from labor
exploitation. Malaysiakini, an online media outlet operated by a human
rights activist, also calls for government action to address labor violations
and discrimination against migrant workers.
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The Malaysian government established a levy system in . Though the
levy was originally intended to be paid by Malaysian employers, the govern-
ment allowed employers to deduct money from employees’ wages to cover
the cost of the levy. Employer practices such as wage deductions, the depor-
tation of migrant workers, and unfair dismissals, are mostly overlooked by
the state. In , the government charged Malaysian employers a levy of
RM, per annum for each foreign worker they hired as a way to protect
jobs for native workers, who are exempted from this tax. Not long after the
levy was introduced, employers immediately deducted RM– per
month from workers’ salary. This practice only ended in  after the
Textile, Clothing and Footwear Workers Union of Australia and the Com-
mittee to Protect Vietnamese Workers exposed the Malaysian employers
(Nike suppliers) for deducting the levy from workers’ wages. However,
in , the Malaysian government agreed that employers could resume the
deduction practice to recoup some of the extra wages migrant workers
received under the new (higher) minimum-wage legislation. The govern-
ment justified this action by claiming that the move to impose a levy on
foreign workers would not be a burden to them as the levy paid is less than
the salary increase.
Thus, foreign workers in the manufacturing, construction, and service
sectors have since  been paying the doubled rate levies via payroll
deduction, serving the interests of the Malaysian government. In ,
the government collected about RM. billion (or about US$ million)
in levy revenue. This revenue is expected to increase in  with the
government decision to raise the levy to RM (from RM,) to be
paid by the employers. However, these statistics do not include revenues
accumulated by the Malaysian brokers, the counterparts of Vietnamese
labor brokers, and Malaysian Airlines.
Vietnamese Governmentality and Labor Export Policies
According to Foucault, modern state power can be a series of productive
networks, which in the case of Vietnam has created the Vietnamese
migrant subjects, the lao động phổ thông [low-skilled workers]. These net-
works started with a bilateral governmental agreement signed between
Vietnam and Malaysia in  to establish a legal framework that
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stipulates the three-year contracts, wages, taxes/levies, and working con-
ditions for migrant workers. Subsequent policies stipulated specific condi-
tions to send Vietnamese migrants to work there and to return to Vietnam
at the end of their contracts. In , the state ratified the Law on Viet-
namese Workers Working Overseas According to Labor Contracts,
which set out the procedures to deal with all stages of the labor export
process and established contracts with state-owned, private, and privatized
state recruitment companies.
In , the Vietnamese state further developed its labor export policy
through the Prime Minister Decision /CP (–), which aims to
eradicate hunger, reduce poverty, and create jobs for poor citizens in desig-
nated rural districts. As such, the government produces biopower, which
benefits its citizens (through remittances) and the state itself (through
recruitment fees and interests). In , at least US$. billion was remitted
to Vietnam. Specifically, the /CP policy allocates funding and support,
such as low-interest loans, language and skills training, and health checks to
send migrants from the sixty-five government-designated poor rural dis-
tricts (mostly in the north and central provinces such as Thanh Hoá, Nghệ
An, Hà Tĩnh, Quảng Ngãi, and three poor districts in the south) to work
primarily in Malaysia, and to a lesser extent in the UAE and Libya.
Between  and , the Vietnamese government sent , Viet-
namese workers to Malaysia, , in , and , in , when
thousands of Vietnamese migrants lost their jobs due to the  global
financial crisis. Starting in , Malaysia resumed accepting Vietnamese
workers for low-skilled jobs in electronics, mechanics, sewing, jewelry, latex
gloves, construction, restaurants, and seafood farming. Many Malaysian
outsourcing companies preferred female workers. Mr. Paul Wong, president
of a Malaysian outsourcing company, stated: “We want to recruit female
workers because they are hard-working, smart, and disciplined.” Indeed,
the  statistics show that out of , Vietnamese migrants working in
manufacturing, garment, and construction in Malaysia, more are women
(,) than men (,).
Global actors also contribute to the management of border crossings to
work in higher-paying countries. The Migrant Resources Center (MRC), part
of the Department of Overseas Labor (DOLAB), received support from the
40 T RẦN AND C R I N I S
ILO, which has an influence on the Vietnamese state broker system. With
financial support from the International Organization for Migration, the
MRC main office in Hà Nội works with DOLAB to provide small brochures
in Vietnamese and English to inform potential migrant workers of their rights
and responsibilities and to provide general information about the receiving
countries and addresses of DOLAB offices there. While visiting this MRC
office, we learned that the staff had received complaint by phone frommigrant
workers in Malaysia and connected them to the proper recruitment compa-
nies to facilitate resolution for those migrant workers. But these efforts were
insufficient in resolving complaints.
N E W S P A P E R S A N D I N V E S T I G A T I V E J O U R N A L I S T S
The mass media, as a part of the state, plays an important role in creating
Vietnamese low-skilled workers appropriate for Malaysia as a “potential
market for the poor” [thị trường tiềm năng với người nghèo]. Major news
outlets such as Người Lao Động [The Laborer] and Lao Động [Labor] have
been the official forums of the state for broadcasting labor export policies.
They encourage work in Malaysia by advertising the low requirements
needed to work there, in contrast to entering the labor markets in Japan,
Korean, or Taiwan.
However, some investigative journalists sharply criticized the flaws of
this system, particularly weak state investigators who turned a blind eye to
corruption and irresponsible recruitment companies. Since , the
media have reported the wrongdoings of many Vietnamese state and pri-
vatized state recruitment companies, unauthorized labor recruiters, and
their Malaysian outsourcing company counterparts. Owing to these
media efforts, the state sanctioned these practices and DOLAB has
improved its website by listing “bad” recruitment companies whose li-
censes were withdrawn.
In September , Nguyễn Duy, an investigative journalist specializing
in labor export and Vietnamese labor migration around the world, sharply
criticized the /CP policy for failing to help the poor rural districts
for which it was designed. In an article titled “Failure of a Project Worth
Thousands of Billions of Vietnamese Dong,” he shows that after six years of
implementation of the labor export policy in  with a budget of
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US $,, the state was able to send only nine thousand migrants from
a few of the sixty-five targeted poor districts nationwide to work overseas,
mostly in Malaysia.
The migrant returnees often called and sent letters, not only to Người Lao
Động and Lao Động newspapers, but also other news outlets such as Tuổi
Trẻ and Tuổi Trẻ Online, Thanh Niên, and VietNam Net. They complained
about the irresponsibility of recruitment companies and the DOLAB office
in the Vietnamese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur; most of these organizations
did not respond to their concerns and complaints. In short, the media in
Vietnam has had to strike a difficult balance between serving the state by
promoting labor export policies, and advocating for the rights of migrant-
workers by exposing abuses.
R E C R U I T M E N T C O M P A N I E S , B R O K E R S , B A N K S
The Vietnamese state governs low-skilled migrant subjects through MoLISA,
together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior.
DOLAB, an administrative unit under the Ministry of Labor, oversees all
stages of this labor export policy: pre-departure, the time overseas, and the
return home. Its offices are stationed in the sixty countries that host Viet-
namese migrant workers working on temporary labor contracts. This is sim-
ilar to the function of the Philippine International Labor Affairs Service, which
has representatives in their embassies and consular offices worldwide.
DOLAB works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ consular
departments to explore foreign labor markets and to address under- and
unemployment in Vietnam. DOLAB monitors the trends in labor demand
around the world and publishes country-specific requirements for temporary
workers on their official website. InMalaysia, the DOLAB office is located in
the Vietnamese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, which is a long distance—hun-
dreds of miles away—from Johor Bahru and other manufacturing centers.
This office is charged with resolving grievances and complaints lodged by the
Vietnamese migrants there, but has often failed to respond to the issues.
To aid in understanding the “productive networks” of the recruitment
system with its strong state influence, below is an analysis of the sources of
labor brokers.
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S T A T E R E C R U I T M E N T C O M P A N I E S A N D T H E I R B R O K E R S
Geographical distribution of recruitment companies in Vietnam reveals
sustained state influence in governing labor export policy. MoLISA grants
licenses to  labor export/recruitment companies, of which  are in
the north, six in the center, and forty-eight in the south of Vietnam. Most
companies concentrate in the north because most recruitment companies
were formerly state-owned corporations originating in northern Vietnam.
These formerly state-owned companies are called “Tổng Công Ty ” or
“the  general corporations,” after the year they were inaugurated.
These state corporations controlled production and export of strategic
products such as steel, coal, oil and natural gas, but also had their own
“labor export” departments. For instance, two interviewees (Ms. Lan and
Ms. Hương) were recruited by the Vietnamese Steel Company [Tổng Công
Ty Thép Việt Nam] (VSC), one of the state-owned “ general
corporations.”
Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, the state had implemented a privatization process [cổ phần hóa]
from – to transform state-owned enterprises. This resulted in
varying levels of private ownership: from joint-stock companies (with over
 percent of state shares so the state maintains control), to joint ventures,
to one-member companies (the state as the sole owner with limited liabil-
ities). However, many privatized state recruitment companies are still
connected to the original ministries or the provincial people’s committees.
One example is the Suleco company, where we interviewed many returnees
who gave us leads to their friends who were still in Malaysia at that time.
During our interviews in , Suleco was still a state-owned overseas
employment service company under the management of the Hồ Chí Minh
City labor department. By mid-, Suleco was slated to become a joint-
stock company, but that did not happen because, according to Mr. Trần
Văn Thạnh, “the HCMC labor department still had to find employment for
war invalids and redundant [laid-off state] workers in HCMC.” Seven
years later, in , following the privatization trend, it became the Export
Labor and Professionals Service Joint Stock Company [Cổ phần Dịch vụ
Xuất khẩu Lao động & Chuyên Gia], which focused on training workers
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and professionals to work in Japan. Four of our interviewees, Ms. Phương,
Ms. Mai, Ms. Nhàn, Ms. Xuân, were recruited by Suleco.
Another interviewee, Mr. Đông, was recruited by Traconsin Investment
and Construction and Transportation Joint Stock Company [Công ty cổ
phần đầu tư và xây dựng giao thông Phương Thành – Traconsin]. The
company had nominally privatized in , yet it remains connected to the
Ministry of Transport. Another interviewee, Ms. Chương, was recruited by
Vilimex Joint Stock Company in Nghệ An province, north-central Vietnam,
which specializes in agricultural products. This company is still connected to
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Yet another inter-
viewee, Mr. Anh, was recruited by Việt Hà joint-stock company in Hà Tĩnh
province, north-central Vietnam—another company privatized since 
that remains connected to the People’s Committee of Hà Tĩnh Province.
This company exports wood products as well as labor to Taiwan, Malaysia,
and the Middle East.
Even the Vietnamese General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) and par-
liamentary committees created recruitment companies for profit. For
instance, Latuco-International Labor Supply Company, which previously
belonged to the VGCL and was headquartered in the north, recruited and
sent workers to work overseas, including Malaysia, beginning in the early
s. It quietly ceased to exist as of  due to many complaints from
migrant workers. Three interviewees (Mr. Dương, Ms. Nga, Ms. Hoa) were
recruited by Latuco and expressed their dissatisfaction with the recruitment
company. Moreover, parliamentary committees can also create recruitment
companies. For instance, the Ethnic Parliamentary Committee had a labor
export department, which it privatized to become Milaco Joint-Stock Com-
pany in . One year later, it started sending thousands of migrants to
work in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Brunei, Malaysia and the Middle East.
Ms. Minh, one of our interviewees, was recruited by Milaco to work in
Malaysia.
Some workers we interviewed met the criteria established by Decision
/CP and were recruited by the same state-owned company; they trav-
eled together because they came from the same hometown. Ms. Lan and
Ms. Hương came from the same village in Hải Dương and were re-
cruited by an employee of the Vietnamese Steel Company (VSC). Some
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came together as siblings, even when being recruited by different com-
panies in Vietnam. The two sisters from Cần Thơ province, Ms. Mai
(recruited by Suleco) and Ms. Minh (recruited by Milaco Joint-Stock
Company) supported each other when Ms. Minh faced robberies in her
dormitory.
S T A T E E M P L O Y M E N T A G E N C I E S A N D T H E I R L A B O R B R O K E R S
Many brokers come from state employment agencies, such as city/provin-
cial employment centers [trung tâm giới thiệu việc làm] overseen by city-
level labor departments of MoLISA, or district employment centers [phòng
giới thiệu việc làm] under district-level labor departments. Brokers can
come from employment centers of the labor federations [Trung tâm việc
làm của Liên Đoàn Lao Động] who acted as liaisons for recruitment com-
panies. In rural areas, labor brokers are from mass organizations, such as
peasants’ and women’s unions, and also have their own employment cen-
ters, such as peasant employment centers [Trung tâm giới thiệu việc làm
Nông Dân].
To meet the labor export quotas discussed above, labor brokers from local
mass organizations, including women’s unions and peasants’ unions, would
visit potential migrants and their parents at their homes to recruit them. For
this small, non-generalizable sample, we did not have information about the
role of labor brokers from local mass organizations at the point of recruit-
ment, but we did find evidence for their role in demanding debt payment
after these migrants had returned to Vietnam, as discussed below.
At the local level, the labor federations’ employment offices recruit
potential migrant workers for some recruitment companies. Mr. Nghĩa,
Mr. Vũ, and Ms. Hoa from An Giang Province were first recruited by state
brokers from the Employment Office of the An Giang Labor Federation for
the /CP program; they were eligible for low-interest loans from the state
banks. After that, the An Giang Employment Office referred them to work
directly with the private recruitment companies: Mr. Vũ worked with Sao
Thai Duong Company, a private company based in Hồ Chí Minh City;
Ms. Hoa worked with the now-defunct Latuco Recruitment Company;
Mr. Nghĩa worked with an unnamed private recruitment company in
An Giang.
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P R I V A T E R E C R U I T M E N T C O M P A N I E S A N D T H E I R L A B O R
B R O K E R S
Given the active role of state recruitment companies and state employ-
ment agencies, the Vietnamese labor market is only partially deregulated,
unlike other countries such as Indonesia. To be sure, private recruit-
ment companies in Vietnam do exist, but they often have some connec-
tions to the state. Many retired state officials in some ministries set up
private recruitment companies, which lends the companies valuable state
support.
For instance, we interviewed administrators of Trường Giang Company
in Hồ Chí Minh City, a private recruitment company that has been sending
workers to Malaysia since . Mr. Hồ Trường Sơn, the administration
president, told Angie Ngọc Trần that he had worked for fourteen years and
had “received their trust and support.” While he did not provide specific
details, the forms of “state support” the company received included access to
I M A G E 1 : An Giang Province Employment Center, overseen by the labor
department (Angie Ngọc Trần, 2014).
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low-interest loans for the migrants they recruited, mostly from the Mekong
Delta provinces such as Đồng Tháp and Sóc Trăng. The company also
posted available jobs in Malaysia on an important state media outlet, Người
Lao Động.
Additionally, Ms. Mã Bạch Phụng, the general president who is ethnically
Hoa and speaks Chinese, Vietnamese, and French, has tight-knit connec-
tions with the Hoa communities in Malaysia: “It is easy to deal with Chinese
Malaysians because we understand each other well. I only deal with ethnic
Chinese (Malaysian) recruiters.” With her established ethnic network,
Ms. Phụng has been able to secure job orders but not enough migrants to
fill them: “The Hoa migrants often work in restaurants [with knowledge of
the Chinese language] whereas the Kinh workers often work in factories
[owned by Chinese Malaysians]. My company provides free Hoa language
classes.” The company has a permanent representative, who is also Hoa, in
Malaysia to respond promptly to the migrants’ needs. Ms. Phụng herself
often goes to Malaysia for several days to set things up.
F I N A N C I A L S O U R C E S F O R F E E S A N D D E B T S
The state creates “systems and technologies” of finance to ensure that
migrants have the means to work overseas, to repay debts, and to send
money home. Two state banks—the Social Policy Bank and the Agriculture
and Rural Development Bank—can lend up to  percent of the total fees/
costs to work overseas. Starting in , MoLISA recommended that the
Social Policy Bank lend to selected poor residents (those in “revolutionary
families” with children of parents who are veterans)  percent of total
labor export costs not exceeding VND million (about US$,). These
state banks offer low-interest loans (. percent per month) to entice
poor residents to work in Malaysia, if they: ) use land ownership as
collateral; ) come from one of the sixty-five poor rural districts; and )
have parents who could co-sign the loan application. Private banks do
exist, but they lend money to potential migrant workers at higher com-
mercial interest rates.
However, the loan amount was barely enough for the migrants to pay the
recruitment and outsourcing companies the US$–$ required for
fees, passports, visas, and orientation classes. Moreover, it costs more for
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migrants from far-flung provinces, because they have to pay room and board
in cities such as Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City while attending orientation
classes on language (such as English for working in Malaysia) and culture to
qualify for a work visa.
In Southeast Asian contexts, most migrants borrow money to finance
their travels to the destination countries. Lan Anh Hoàng and Yeoh stress
the need to pay attention to the significance of debts incurred to finance
transnational labor migration and how they affect the migrant workers and
their families. These scholars highlight differences in transnational labor
migration processes in Latin American and Southeast Asian contexts. In
their qualitative study of thirty-seven migrant households interviewed in
 with family members migrating to work in Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia,
and Japan, Lan Anh Hoàng and Yeoh show the importance of debt payment
in remittance usage, and the “perception of migration venture as a gamble.”
A – nationwide study by the Institute of Social and Labor
Science supports this finding. Over  percent of , migrant worker
returnees (from Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Malaysia) had to borrow money
to work abroad. Of these, two-thirds had to acquire  percent of the
amount. The main sources come from their family networks, and banks.
About ten percent had to borrow money from loan sharks who charged
interest rates above official limits.
Indebtedness is widespread in our sample and also confirmed in our inter-
view with Mr. Trần Văn Thạnh. The migrant workers we interviewed
resorted to a variety of sources, including their families, to finance their
journeys. Mr. Nghĩa, Mr. Vũ, and Ms. Hoa received low-interest loans
(. percent monthly interest) from the Social Policy Bank, having met the
criteria to get low-interest loans from the /CP program. For those who did
not meet the criteria, borrowing money from their families, friends, or rela-
tives was a common practice. Ms. Lan and Ms. Hương each paid VNDmil-
lion for all the fees and the one-way plane ticket to Malaysia. Ms. Chương
(from Thanh Hóa province) received money from her parents—who own
land and generate income by growing rice and vegetables—to pay for all the
fees. Ms. Phương (recruited by Suleco) got funding from private sources.
Seeing a decline in the number of migrants going to work in Malaysia,
Vietnamese recruitment companies and Malaysian outsourcing companies
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did not collect recruitment fees in , equaling about USD$ to Viet-
namese recruiters and USD$ to Malaysian outsourcing companies.
This reduced the total migration cost of each migrant to about USD$,.
To force loan repayments, Vietnam and Malaysia have developed tech-
nologies within the transnational banking system to deduct a monthly
amount from the worker’s paycheck. State bureaucracies from both sides
work closely with each other: DOLAB, the banks, labor export companies
from Vietnam, and one-stop centers and private outsourcing companies
from Malaysia. Interviews with Mr. Nghĩa and Mr. Vũ (in An Giang) in
 confirmed that as soon as they started working in Malaysia, a monthly
loan payment was deducted from their paychecks.
R E M I T T A N C E S A N D D E B T S
According to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, the remittance econ-
omy fits with the Vietnamese government’s goal of reducing unemploy-
ment and creating “good citizens” who can earn money to support
themselves and their families. Empirical evidence shows that
remittances play an important role in the Vietnamese economy. The inflow
is estimated to have increased by some  percent in  and is forecast to
continue to grow in , given record-high global migration numbers in
. Between  and , international remittances received as
a percentage of GDP increased from  percent to . percent. La and
Leung point out that the peak of international remittance inflows of 
percent of the GDP in  was more than three-quarters of foreign direct
investment and more than double the aid flows for that year. A potential
reason for the  peak was that the Law on Vietnamese Labor Working
Abroad Under Contract, ratified in , went into effect.
However, Lan Anh Hoàng and Yeoh show that in many cases, workers
have to repay debts before they can send money home. We found similar
experiences expressed by our migrant interviewees: most migrant workers
have to use their first-year earnings to repay their debts. This estimate of
a one-year average for migrant workers to repay debts is also within the
range estimated by other scholars.
Consistent with Lan Anh Hoàng and Yeoh’s arguments, findings from
the Institute of Social and Labor Science show that over  percent of
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migrant workers send money home periodically (every two to three months)
to address the most pressing needs of their families: about  percent of total
remittances were used to pay back “old” debts and “new” debts that were
accumulated to fund the global migration; about  percent used to fix or
build houses, and the rest used to buy household appliances and to save and
invest. It is very difficult for the migrant workers to escape debts even
when they send money home.
The first year of working in Malaysia is especially difficult financially and
emotionally. As Ms. Hương and Ms. Lan related, “the first year of separation
is the most difficult. We miss our families, have to repay the recruitment
fees, and sometimes [there are] accidents on the job. But we get used to our
job by the second year, and endure our third year [when the contract ends].”
Mr. Dương (from Nghệ An) said: “I came here hoping to make money,
but given the hard working conditions [a twelve-hour work day with low
pay], I told my parents not to expect my remittance, but think of this as
a gambling loss.”
R E M I T T A N C E S A N D O P P O R T U N I T I E S
Despite these risks, remittances can also act as an investment since migrant
workers are aware of the opportunities these money transfers generate for
their families. The overall aspiration expressed by both male and female
interviewees is to send remittances home to their parents and families,
a finding corroborated by other studies.
While the monetary aspect of remittance is important, the non-monetary
aspects are equally significant. Many interviewees remitted money as “altru-
ism towards family members” but not so much for their own savings or
investment. Ms. Hương (from Hải Dương) said:
I work continuously from :AM to :PM without break or food. I come
early to check the [cookie factory] machine and work continuously. That is the
only way to catch up with the speed of the machine and to make more money
because the base pay here is very low. Very hard work but I don’t stop. With
savings, I can send money home: every month I remit VND million. Well, I
have an eleven-year-old son [she proudly showed us her son’s photo] who is
being cared for by my parents.
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Ms. Lan (from Hải Dương) had a similar goal: “Our main goal is to make
money and send money home for our parents to take care of our children
and to send them to schools. Then, later on, we use our savings to build
a house for our children.” Neither mentioned saving money for themselves.
Ms. Hương and Ms. Lan escorted us through a neighborhood in Batu
Pahat, with shops, restaurants, and rows of worker hostels owned by
Chinese Malaysians, to a hostel where we could carry out a focus group
interview with male workers. Our guides knocked on the gate of the hostel
where their fellow migrant workers stayed. We were early, and the men had
just woken up, but they greeted us and invited us to sit on the veranda
where we conducted the interview. In a strong showing of native-place
bonding, all fifteen men came from the north and north-central provinces
of Vietnam; many worked in plastic and paper factories. They were smok-
ing cigarettes and drinking coffee, with their mobile phones constantly
ringing while we talked.
Our male interviewees were also very motivated to send money home to
their families. Mr.Đông (fromHàTĩnh), who worked in a plastic factory, said:
“I miss my family a lot, but because of our circumstance, I had to go work in
Malaysia. My wife and our two children—one in grade  and the other grade
—are still in Hà Tĩnh. My wife is working in the field. When I return home,
I’ll help her till the land, with an “iron buffalo” [trâu sắt, i.e. a tractor]. Every
month, I send home – ringgit.”
As such, Mr. Đông not only performed altruism and reinforced his status in
his family, but he also invested in a means of production, the tractor. Mr.
Anh (from Hà Tĩnh), who worked in a paper factory, said:
I have my wife and our four-year-old daughter at home. My wife and extended
family work in the paddy field, growing rice and potatoes, and raising chickens
and pigs. My parents are still healthy: they are in their sixties. I’m sure I will
find a job when I return. I miss my family a lot: calling them three to four
times per week, the phone calls are very costly, at least – ringgit per
month. Still, every month I send them  ringgit. Now that the boss needs
work, I am trying to renew my contract for one more year.
Apparently, Mr. Anh’s boss wanted to keep him for one more year, since he
paid Mr. Anh’s roundtrip airfare so he could visit his family after three years
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of separation. Mr. Anh seemed to be very confident about finding a job upon
returning home.
For women, transnational labor migration can be a positive experience
as they become financially independent and more confident in working
overseas. Ms. Hương and Ms. Lan, the two friends from Hải Dương, went
to Malaysia even though their husbands were opposed to this decision.
Both women told us that working overseas allows them to become
independent wage earners and to have more influence in family matters.
Ms. Lan said:
We decided to improve our financial situation. In Vietnam, most of us are
confined to the home; we only go to the market to get food and cook our
meals. But here, every month we can save and send home VND– million.
Many husbands did not want their wives to go, but we decided to go.
These findings are similar to a study on Bangladeshi female migrant workers
in the UAE.
Ms. Chương’s story demonstrates an example of the social meaning
and motivational aspects of remittance, where the use of remittance is
co-determined by the migrant workers and their extended families.
Ms. Chương (from Thanh Hoá province) worked at a garment factory in
Johor Bahru. She paid off her debt to Vilimex (a state recruitment company
from Nghệ An) after the first year of working in Malaysia:
I make . ringgit per day and receive only . ringgit for lunch. But for two
years now, I always cook rice and bring lunch to work to save money. It is very
expensive to eat out, and plus I can’t eat Malaysian food. In two years, I had
sent home a total of VND million [about US $,] to my parents. I
wanted to send the first year’s earnings to my parents, and the second’s year’s
earnings to send my younger sister to college, but my mother refused to take it,
because it came from my hard work. I tried to convince her by saying that we
can only gain by putting all our money into my younger sister’s education,
because if her future is good, then our whole family’s is also good. Then my
mother said they could pay for my sister’s education [using their income from
growing rice and vegetables] and put my remittance money in the bank for me
to use in the future. I think I may take it in the future, but it is not
necessary . . . I still believe that it is better for my parents to use the money for
my sister’s education.
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Ms. Chương is able to negotiate her dual responsibilities transnationally:
as a daughter who wants her parents to have an easier time in their old age,
and as a sister who wants her younger sister to be successful in college.
D I S C I P L I N I N G T E C H N I Q U E S W H I L E W O R K I N G I N M A L A Y S I A
To cope with the Malaysian state’s discipline and other challenges while in
Malaysia, Vietnamese migrant subjects have resisted, individually and col-
lectively. Our in-depth interviews with workers in Malaysia before and after
the  global financial crisis gave us firsthand accounts of a range of
adversities they faced upon arrival in Malaysia.
Most interviewees worked for suppliers in construction and manufactur-
ing industries that serve as subcontractors for global supply chains. The
most common complaints we heard include the humiliating recruitment
process that subjected female migrants to pregnancy tests—which continued
periodically even after they had started working in Malaysia. Other com-
plaints include the uncertainty of job placement—because workers had no
direct contact with the Malaysian companies hiring them, they had little
protection or recourse when their contracts were violated. Vietnamese
migrant workers, like other foreign migrant workers, had their passports
impounded by their employers upon arrival. They were issued temporary
legal employment ID cards, but this made them vulnerable to the local
Malaysian police and limited their mobility.
Fear of robberies is the most palpable sense of insecurity caused by the
 financial crisis. According to Lan Anh Hoàng and Yeoh, as the crisis
heightened, many Vietnamese workers lost their jobs, received a reduction
in wages, or were repatriated. The interviewees mentioned widespread
robberies, but could not determine whether local Malay, Vietnamese, or
other overseas ethnic groups took part. Some were Vietnamese male
workers who lost or left their jobs before their contracts ended and thus
were unable to work legally in Malaysia and could not afford to return
to Vietnam.
We interviewed Ms. Chương in Johor in . She signed a three-year
contract with a Malaysian company called Sing Lun Garments, a subsidiary
of Sing Lun Holdings of Singapore, which manufactures different types of
garments and employs around five hundred workers in the Johor Bahru
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factory. While taking a taxi to meet us at a shopping mall, Ms. Chương was
almost a victim of an attempted robbery. She recounted the incident and told
us that she did not plan to extend her contract:
Unlike other companies, this [Sing Lun] is a pretty good company. They keep
all their promises on the labor contract . . . I paid my debt to a Vietnamese
recruitment company in Hà Nội . . .But I will never return to work here. Good
men from Vietnam turn bad here. They did not like their jobs, or their jobs did
not provide enough overtime work for them to earn enough to pay back debts
and save a little; those men ended their contracts early, went underground, and
many joined gangs as a way to make money, or got into drinking and gam-
bling, which got them further into debt.
The Malaysian government has a vested interest in some modicum of
welfare for their foreign migrant workers. They require that employers
provide basic accommodations for foreign workers. However, in reality,
MTUC points out that many foreign workers have been forced to live in
unsafe, substandard, unhygienic, and overcrowded conditions that subject
them to high levels of stress. Foremost among these sources of stress is the
fear of robberies, which has terrorized many female workers because sexual
violence often accompanies these robberies.
In the next section, we explain how workers overcome their fear and seek
help to solve problems of sexual violence and robbery.
D E V E L O P I N G C H R I S T I A N M I G R A N T S U B J E C T S
Under the Malaysian government, Vietnamese workers participated in
some Christian networks in both Batu Pahat and Penang for support, faith,
and friendship. As a result of these activities, some migrant workers con-
verted to Christianity and, at the same time, found a safe space in their new
churches.
The Christian umbrella allowed the Vietnamese workers to see them-
selves as subjects of Vietnam and as part of a large Christian family facing
a complex and culturally diverse urban environment. Ms. Chương told us
that she found comfort in this religious refuge after the robbery attempts.
When working in Johor, she found a supportive community and joined
a Protestant group called “The Vietnamese Family in Malaysia.” The group
is run by a Vietnamese couple who are pastors in Malaysia along with some
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visiting pastors who would come for short-term visits from Canada and the
United States. Every weekend, she participated in Bible classes and activities
with other Vietnamese migrant workers.
Religious organizations have also provided a space for migrant workers to
think of themselves as a collective group, to help each other, and to appeal to
Malaysian trade union and civil society groups. In Kuala Lumpur, the
Migrant Ministry allows Vietnamese workers to operate a helpline on their
days off or after work hours. One Vietnamese worker we interviewed spoke
English and acted as a volunteer and translator for other Vietnamese work-
ers who were experiencing difficulties regarding court attendance and deten-
tion. Some proactive workers from this Christian-based group also went to
the Trade Union Office to report labor violations and injuries. These Viet-
namese workers provided a platform for workers to connect to Malaysian
labor institutions and to meet other workers to discuss their experiences and
problems.
But not every migrant worker can get access to religious support net-
works or wants to be part of a religious group. In some cases, workers
engaged in other forms of collective action, at times in the hostels where
they stayed, to force their employers to provide safe accommodation.
R E S I S T I N G R O B B E R I E S
The following case demonstrates an instance of migrant workers being aware
of their vulnerability and acting in solidarity to demand safety for all the
workers in a hostel. In this case, the threat of rape and violence that accom-
pany robberies, led female Vietnamese workers to become active agents re-
sisting male domination at the grassroots level. Different levels of power and
resistance exist among migrant workers of different ethnicities and genders.
Batu Pahat is an industrial town in the state of Johor that produces
around  percent of Malaysia’s clothing and textiles and is home to a large
number of short-term foreign migrant workers. It was here that we met Ms.
Minh, who had come to visit her sister Ms. Mai, who was staying at one of
the hostels we visited.
Ms. Minh came to say goodbye to her sister because she was returning
home at the end of her contract. “No more working here due to robberies,”
she told us. She recounted how the Vietnamese female workers led a two-day
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protest in the hostel of the Gimmill garment factory in Batu Pahat to
demand timely measures for the safety of all workers living there. While
she complained about the low pay at this factory, the scariest thing was the
unsafe living conditions in the hostel:
I earn piece-rate, making clothes to export to Singapore. Most workers are
Vietnamese women, with only six Vietnamese men; the rest are from
Malaysia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. It happened once before: the robbers
came on pay day, demanded workers’ ATM cards and the PIN numbers.
This is a small hostel, and we were nervous because there is a night shift and
the alley leading to the front gate is always dark. One day in April  we
had just gotten paid; then we heard someone yelling “robbery, robbery!” We
then used our mobile phones to call the Malaysian police, who came to stop
this attempt. But after that, we staged a two-day protest in the hostel,
demanding more guards, a more secure gate, and better lighting in the
alleyway. I do not know who sparked the protest, but I know that someone
called the company’s office, and then all of us [three hundred migrants lived
in the hostel] went on strike for our safety. We elected several Vietnamese
representatives who could speak Malay to talk to the foremen. Then we
walked together to the factory and sent our representatives inside to talk to
the management . . .
The image of hundreds of Vietnamese migrants walking together to the
factory to talk to management is powerful. Their collective action brought
a temporary solution, although some workers still voted with their feet due
to continuing lack of security in the long-run:
Well, it turns out that the company only provided one additional guard (so
there are two now), and they added barbed wire surrounding the hostel’s wall.
Nothing sturdy! Nevertheless, since then, nothing has happened, and we feel
pretty safe. But after this incident, some Vietnamese workers moved out to
bigger hostels; some even returned to Vietnam.
These migrants utilized technology (mobile phones) and language skills
(speaking Malay to the boss) to empower themselves to fight back. While
this was only a short-term solution to their living conditions, these Viet-
namese workers successfully forced management to improve safety in and
around their hostel.
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B E C O M I N G “ U N D O C U M E N T E D ” I N M A L A Y S I A A S A F O R M O F
R E S I S T A N C E
As the migrant subjects were controlled by the disciplining systems of Viet-
nam (such as debts and labor contracts) and Malaysia (such as levies and
impounded passports), some workers resisted by leaving their jobs before
the end of their contracts, becoming undocumented migrants. When all else
fails, becoming undocumented in Malaysia gives migrants some control over
their chance of improving their conditions before eventually finding a way
home. To be sure, this could increase their vulnerability or further exploi-
tation. But for many runaway migrants, they can find short-term, under-the-
table, paid employment, which gives them a way to obtain proper documen-
tation, especially a passport, buy a plane ticket home, and pay other fees to
the Malaysian government.
While doing fieldwork in Batu Pahat in Malaysia in , we spotted
a female worker, Ms. Thanh from Thanh Hoá, who was peeling garlic and
washing dishes for a Chinese-Malaysian restaurant. We learned from her
that she had left a garment factory before the end of her contract, had
become an “undocumented” migrant worker, and was working under-
ground for this restaurant.
According to her, “the Vietnamese agency [Latuco] sold us here. We
sold ourselves to work here.” Recognizing the act of “commodifying” herself,
she took an active step by becoming “undocumented” to escape exploitative
working conditions and violation of the terms that she agreed to in Vietnam.
Her awareness pushed her to flee, seeking employment without a work
permit, and receiving help from a network of documented workers living
in hostels nearby. In our follow-up phone conversation with Ms. Hương in
, we learned that an informal migrant network had been giving clothes
and food to Ms. Thanh and other undocumented female workers who had
left the same garment factory.
Ms. Thanh’s complaints against this VGCL-owned recruitment company
had fallen on deaf ears: “I called them [the two Latuco officials: one in Vietnam
and the other inMalaysia] many times but only got their excuses that they will
have to investigate this problem. So far, they have not gotten back to me.” The
Malaysian government also took advantage of these underground migrants by
charging them a fee to return their passports. Ms. Thanh complained about
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these high costs, plus an air ticket home, to reunite with her family and child
(cared for by her parents at the time of the interview):
There are many workers like us who no longer have our passports due to our
ending the contracts early. But we all know that it would cost a worker between
RM, to ,, paid to the Vietnamese Embassy personnel who would
handle all the transactions to get back our passports, to pay the airfare (about
RM for a one-way ticket onMalaysian Airlines, which is a requirement), the
levy owed to the Malaysian government, and other fees. So I could save RM
per month; then I can find my way home in the next several months.
Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing how she and other undocu-
mented migrants fared, but we do know that she received support from the
documented community, and found some way to make money to reunite
with her family. The bigger picture is the inability of the Vietnamese state to
protect the migrant workers. An ILO study found that only a third received
responses to their formal complaints and  percent of this subgroup
considered the settlement to be unsatisfactory.
I M A G E 2 : An undocumented worker receives support from other migrant
workers in Malaysia (Angie Ngọc Trần, 2008).
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Subjects’ Productive Power: Debt Payment
and Multi-stage Migration
Modern power is localized at the everyday level. The Institute of Social and
Labor Science found that about  percent of migrant returnees, mostly
from Malaysia, did not repay their debts. This may be a form of feet
dragging to pay off the debts and an act of resistance against having to
repay the low-interest state loans, of which they received only a small
percentage.
D R A G G I N G F E E T T O R E P A Y D E B T S
In another critical assessment of Decision /CP, we found that many Cham
Muslim migrants who sign the loan documents to borrow money to work in
Malaysia refused to pay the low-interest state loans. The justification was
that they only received a small fraction of the loan (around – percent of
the total amount) from state banks, while transnational state institutions
(Vietnamese recruitment companies and Malaysian outsourcing companies)
received the lion’s share.
Kinh migrant workers had similar experiences. Mr. Nghĩa received a low-
interest loan of VNDmillion from the Social Policy Bank and had paid off
all his debt in the first year working in Malaysia. Mr. Vũ received a low-
interest loan (a special dispensation from the Social Policy Bank for former
soldiers like himself), but he still owed VND million. Ms. Hoa received
a low-interest loan from Social Policy Bank, but she still owed VND mil-
lion. Ms. Thanh, the undocumented migrant, dragged her feet to pay the
interest demanded by a state bank in Thanh Hoá.
To those who borrowed money from state banks, the state creates an
elaborate system, including local government offices and mass organiza-
tions, to demand debt repayment. The Debt Collection Team [Ban chỉ đạo
thu hồi nợ] is one such apparatus that has members from the women’s
unions and local state officials (down to the ward level); together they visit
the returnees and their families at home every month to pressure them to
repay. But the returnees resist when they can. Ms. Hoa, who is an ethnic
Chinese, only paid when she had work, using a legitimate excuse: being poor
and taking care of an old mother.
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S T E P W I S E M I G R A T I O N
Migrant workers in Malaysia are eager to explore better options, while still
remaining within the constraints of the neoliberal transnational state system.
The Institute of Social and Labor Science found that on average the total
savings of migrant returnees from Malaysia is the lowest of Vietnamese
migrants: VND million, compared to VN million for migrants from
Taiwan, VN million for migrants from Korea and VN million for
migrants from Japan. Many of our interviewees knew those facts and used
Malaysia as a stepping stone to prepare them for other desirable destina-
tions. Consistent with Wang and Bélanger, we found a similar hierarchy
of destination countries from our interviewees. Migrants aspired to engage
in an incremental upward-mobility strategy. They had plans and goals to
work their way up, starting with Malaysia as the first step, then Korea,
Taiwan, and Japan as successive steps—countries that demanded higher fees
and skill sets, but also paid higher wages and benefits. Their expectations are
to improve their living conditions and to save and invest along the way.
These workers want to accumulate capital to help their families and to travel
to new places in the hope of improving their futures.
About one-third of all our interviewees, upon their return from Malaysia,
expressed interest in going to Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, or Macau to improve
their lives. Still, as migrant subjects, they rely on state power, which requires
differentiated fees—VND–million to Korea, and VND–million to
Japan, using  prices; language requirements; and a college education. The
migrants’ preferred mobility sequence seems to follow what they can afford
(the fee levels) and their competencies (language and education levels): first to
Korea, then Taiwan, then Japan.
Ms. Huệ (from An Giang) was very excited about the possibility of
stepwise international migration even with some reservation about her age:
If there is an opportunity, I still want to work overseas, in a different country to
learn new things. For example, I’d go anywhere offered by the [recruitment]
company—but not Malaysia again—another country such as Korea. But I’m
concerned that with my “old” age [ years old], I can no longer go.
Her broader worldview and love for learning was inspired after the
Malaysia trip.
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Mr. Vũ (from An Giang) expressed his cautious aspiration for the desti-
nations of Korea and Japan:
I also want to go to work in Korea, hearing [from some recruitment com-
panies] that salaries were high over there, but the fee is also high: VND
–million. If there is no work in Korea, how can I repay this huge debt? As
of May , I learned that it costs VND million to go to Japan. Well, if I
can’t even repay VND million [to go to Malaysia], then I’d be doomed if
there is no work in Korea while incurring such a big debt!
With the Malaysia experiences under their belts, many worker intervie-
wees became self-confident while being realistic about their employment
and living conditions. Mr. Nghĩa from An Giang, a successful entrepreneur,
seems to be more confident with his technical and language skills and was
ready to take on another overseas job in a better labor market: “I really want
to go to Korea to work: any job would be fine with me, as long as the wage is
high, and especially for jobs that deal with fixing mobile phones. After
returning home from Malaysia, I learned to speak a little English and have
been improving it in a language class.” Ms. Hoa, the ethnic Chinese
woman, had a very realistic assessment of whether she can climb this ladder:
“When I returned here [fromMalaysia], I want to go to work in Korea. Some
of my friends [fromMalaysia] had registered to go to Korea. But they all said
that Korea requires a lot of money [for fees] and a language exam
[Korean].”
Follow-up conversations with Ms. Phương in Hồ Chí Minh City show
that she maintained close contact with her friends to get information on job
availability in Malaysia and to sustain friendships and support. Ms. Phương
came from a big family of twelve people. Her older siblings were educated,
but her parents could not afford to pay for the younger kids. She only
finished grade . Returning to Vietnam from Malaysia, she continued to
search for better-paying jobs, while still hoping to work in other countries
with better pay and conditions:
At the end of my contract in Malaysia in , the company wanted to renew
my three-year contract, but I declined because I wanted to go home and apply
to work in different countries. But with my old age [being old is her perception
since she was only  at the time of the  interview], I don’t have many
opportunities. When I contacted a representative of another recruitment
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company, they told me straight out that I’m too old now to work overseas. In
general, it is easier for young women to find jobs. Most employers seek young
women between  and .
In sum, the migrant subjects choose to engage in stepwise upward mobility
to improve their situations.
Conclusion
At the time of this writing, two recently signed MOUs demonstrate that
Vietnam andMalaysia control migrant workers while also investing in them.
In August , in response to complaints by Vietnamese migrant workers,
the Malaysian government signed an MOU with the Vietnamese govern-
ment to rectify some loopholes that have enabled labor exploitation. In
particular, Vietnamese workers now have the right to retain their passports
and personal documents. It is mandatory that Malaysian employers—not
labor brokers—come to pick up the Vietnamese workers from the airport
within six hours of their landing in the country. This new form of labor
contract regulates the responsibility of Malaysian employers, labor brokers,
Vietnamese workers, and recruitment enterprises, and contains regulations
on wages and working hours. The second MOU was signed by the VGCL
and the MTUC in February . The two unions moved forward by devel-
oping plans to implement this MOU and to identify priorities for collabo-
ration and implementation.
What makes this Malaysia-Vietnam configuration of labor migration
and globalization distinctive from other cases—such as Indonesian and
Bangladeshi migration by people who share the same religion with the
Malays—is the sustaining control of the Vietnamese state in all aspects of the
labor migration process: funding/debts, recruitment, and remittances. This
transnational case study yields a new insight into globalization: even with over
twenty years of market reform, the Vietnamese labor market is not completely
deregulated (or as fully deregulated as that of Indonesia, Bangladesh and the
Philippines). State formal institutions (such as ministries, state banks, labor
brokers from state agencies, mass organizations, people’s committees, and
state media) and informal entities (such as privatized state recruitment com-
panies still connected to their former ministries and people’s committees)
continue to manage labor migration. Moreover, the state power in Vietnam
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is not complete, given a pro-labor state media which at times sides with the
social body—the migrant subjects—to criticize the state. As such, the state
sometimes faces counterattacks by its subjects and also by the media, which
are part of the state itself. This form of state power, counterbalanced from
both within and without, is conceptually different from that of the other labor
sending countries, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines.
Still, the Vietnamese system of governmentality is stable and self-
reinforcing, allowing control over migrant workers. Recent developments
demonstrate that the transnational state power of Vietnam and Malaysia is
productive and both governments benefit. TheMalaysian state benefits froman
increase in tax revenue due to doubling the levy amount paid by migrant
workers starting , and from having unwanted jobs filled by Vietnamese
citizens and other foreign workers. The Vietnamese state continues to send
poor ruralmigrants toMalaysia to address unemployment problems, as well as
making money on the backs of their subjects by way of fees, interest payments
and remittances.
Insights learned from interviewing in situ in Malaysia and in Vietnam
confirm Foucault’s modern power at the everyday level: where there is
power, there is resistance. Migrant workers negotiate their ways to send
money home, form religion-based groups to support each other, appeal to
newspapers, and fight back to protect themselves. As subjects who are capa-
ble of choosing how to act, workers also want to accumulate capital for
a better life. For poor migrants, the Malaysian labor market is what they
can afford to gain some internal empowerment: new skills, new languages,
self-development, self-confidence, and independence.
The disciplining of the transnational governmentality in Vietnam and
Malaysia has created a global context and a larger worldview for the migrant
returnees. Many enterprising migrants aspire to engage in upward mobility
beyond Malaysia, in a multistage global migration to their preferred destina-
tions. This demonstrates that the hegemony of the transnational labor
migration infrastructure is never fully achieved.
In conclusion, there are two areas for further research: First is the making
of Christian subjects (the Vietnamese migrants in Johor Bahru). This topic
requires more study on the intent and implications of these religious groups
for migrant workers in Malaysia—would a Christian subject be in conflict
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with a migrant subject? Second is the rise of new labor markets in the Middle
East, where the demand for women workers has been increasing, yet protec-
tions (from the state and the unions) against sexual abuses are not yet in sight.
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A B S T R A C T
Drawing on Foucault’s concepts of biopolitical subject formation and
governmentality, this article seeks to understand transnational state power
and how Vietnamese migrant workers negotiate within a transnational
framework both while working in Malaysia and upon their return to
Vietnam. By conducting multi-sited interviews in Vietnam and Malaysia
between  and , we contribute to the transnational labor migration
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literature by focusing on Vietnamese factory and construction workers in
Malaysia and their resistance to transnational state power. We argue that
these two emerging economies, as part of the neoliberal world, use their
systems, media, and technologies to produce and manage citizens (in Viet-
nam) and non-citizen subjects (migrants in Malaysia) who comply with
labor export policy and foreign worker policy, respectively. These two states
ensure both government and individual accumulation to sustain their
power. Meanwhile, Vietnamese migrant subjects negotiate their roles, resist
when necessary, and at times, even benefit from overseas labor migration.
K E Y W O R D S : Migrant labor, Vietnam, Malaysia, Labor Export Policy,
Governmentality, Subject Formation
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